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The Promise of Democracy for the Americas: 
U.S. Diplomacy and the Meaning(s) of World 
War II in El Salvador, 1941– 1945
Jorrit van den Berk*
Warning:  The High Principles Expressed Herein Are Purely 
Propaganda, to Be Taken Seriously Only at Your Own Risk.
William Krehm, 1944 (20)
In early 1944, radio listeners in El Salvador were assured several times a day 
that “[Y] ou don’t ask for liberty, you conquer it. United, the United Nations will 
triumph.” Somewhat anticlimactically, the radio announcer continued with the 
advice to “take Mejoral” for “your headaches” (Krehm 21). Sterling Products, 
the U.S. manufacturer of Mejoral aspirins, had its slogan from the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs (OCIAA), the U.S. government’s agency 
for the coordination of wartime relations with the Latin American republics, 
which blanketed the continent with pro- Allies propaganda during World 
War II. William Krehm, a U.S. journalist critical of his country’s policies in Latin 
America, claimed at the time that the OCIAA was “blissfully unaware of the 
dynamite it was sending into Latin America’s tyrant- ridden lands.” El Salvador 
was indeed “tyrant- ridden:” the dictatorial regime of Maximiliano Hernández 
Martínez had been in power for thirteen years by the end of the war. Things 
were about to change, however. During the spring of 1944 a failed military 
uprising followed by a successful civilian strike toppled Martínez and inaugu-
rated an all- too brief experiment with civilian, democratic government in El 
Salvador. Appropriately, the same radio announcer who told Salvadorans to 
take liberty (and aspirins) also announced the fall of the dictator (Krehm 21).
This brief anecdote raises a number of important questions about U.S. war-
time diplomacy in El Salvador. Firstly, what role did authoritarian regimes 
* This article references to a large degree hitherto unpublished sources from the National 
Archive of the United States. In order to facilitate the reading experience, the references to 
archival material have been relegated to the footnotes.
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such as that of Martínez play in the U.S.- led wartime alliance against European 
dictatorship and Japanese militarism? Secondly, how did the U.S. government, 
through the activities of the OCIAA, frame its informational programs for El 
Salvador? Following up on that question, how were these programs received 
by various audiences in the country? Did they lead to the anti- dictatorial rev-
olution against Martínez, as William Krehm seems to imply? Lastly, how did 
U.S. diplomats respond to that revolutionary activity? In answering these ques-
tions, this contribution seeks to explain what meaning U.S. public diplomacy 
programs acquired in the context of Salvadoran politics during World War II.†
Considering the extent of wartime propaganda activities in Latin America, 
several scholars suggest that a connection must exist between U.S.  public 
diplomacy and the (temporary) demise of dictatorship throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Exactly how such propaganda was received by local audiences 
remains unclear, however. It is unlikely, as Krehm believed, that U.S. propa-
ganda caused resistance to local dictatorships, especially since such opposition 
predates the foundation of the OCIAA. A key assumption behind the argument 
set forth in this text is that the anti- authoritarian movement that surfaced in 
El Salvador by the end of the war was largely indigenous in its origins and ide-
ologies.1 As this paper will show, however, Salvadorans regularly adopted the 
language of the war and referred to wartime programs when they confronted 
U.S. diplomats with the contradictions in their nation’s foreign policy. The lat-
ter were slow to recognize that the ideology of World War II could have any 
† A note on terminology:  throughout this text I  will use terms such as “public diplomacy,” 
“informational programs” or “propaganda” interchangeably to refer to U.S. efforts to influence 
audiences in El Salvador. My use of these terms is not intended to convey my judgment on the 
activities of the OCIAA, nor does it reflect adherence to any particular theoretical framework. 
Following conventions in the field of Latin American studies, I will use the term “America” to 
refer to nations of the Western Hemisphere and “U.S.” to refer to the United States of America.
1 Victor Bulmer- Thomas, The Political Economy of Central America since 1920 (Cambridge 
University Press: New York, 1987), 101; Patricia Parkman, Nonviolent Insurrection in El 
Salvador. The Fall of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (University of Arizona Press:  Tucson, 
1988), 32– 33; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “Introduction:  The Postwar Conjuncture 
in Latin America:  Democracy, Labor, and the Left,” in idem eds., Latin America between the 
Second World War and the Cold War, 1944– 1948 (Cambridge University Press:  New  York, 
1992), 1– 32, there 6– 7; David Rock, “War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the 
United States,” in idem ed., Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (University 
of California Press: Berkeley, 1994), 15– 40, there 19– 21; Thomas M. Leonard, “The OIAA in 
Central America: The Coordinating Committees at Work,” in Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch 
eds., ¡Américas Unidas! Nelson A.  Rockefeller’s Office of Inter- American Affairs (1940– 1946) 
(Vervuert: Frankfurt, 2012), 283– 312, there 288.
The Promise of Democracy for the Americas 243
meaning in El Salvador and, in the end, U.S. diplomacy proved too inflexible 
to adapt to the new directions that Salvadorans set out for themselves. In that 
sense, the current text adds a critical note to this volume by tracing the poten-
tial and ultimate insignificance of “liberation” in a region that the United States 
had long considered its own “backyard.”
Both U.S. public diplomacy and its relation with Latin American dictators 
during World War II should be understood against the background of the 
rise and decline of the Good Neighbor policy during the 1930s and 1940s. 
Observing Latin American hostility toward U.S. military, diplomatic, and eco-
nomic intervention throughout the 1920s, the Franklin Roosevelt administra-
tion had adopted the so- called Good Neighbor policy toward the nations of the 
Western Hemisphere when it came into office in 1933. The backbone of that 
policy was U.S. recognition of the sovereignty and equality of all the nations 
of the Americas and, by extension, the adoption by the United States of the 
nonintervention principle. The Roosevelt administration withdrew U.S. troops 
from Haiti and Nicaragua; negotiated an end to the Platt Amendment to the 
Cuban constitution, which gave the U.S. the right to intervene in the island’s 
politics; and ended the non- recognition policy by which Washington had tried 
to push Salvadoran President Martínez out of office.
Historical assessments of the Good Neighbor policy and especially the prac-
tice of nonintervention have developed over time. According to Bryce Wood, 
it was because of the Good Neighbor that, by 1939, “the United States had 
established, with the assistance of certain Latin American states, an unprece-
dented set of relationships productive of a nearly solidary American attitude 
toward threats from without.” Especially when compared to the lack of Latin 
American enthusiasm for cooperation during World War I and the later Korean 
War, the support that the United States received from its Latin American allies 
during World War II was, according to Wood, the greatest triumph for the Good 
Neighbor. Only toward the end of the war did U.S. interventionism reemerge 
when Ambassador Spruille Braden attempted to preempt the election of Juan 
Perón in Argentina. From that time onward, the Good Neighbor was steadily 
“dismantled” (Wood 1961 and 1985).
Wood’s argument represents a generation of historians who regard U.S.- 
Latin American cooperation during World War II as a high point for the Good 
Neighbor policy, before the relationship soured again during the Cold War. More 
critical voices emphasize the continuity between the early 20th century and the 
Cold War (see Gilderhus 91– 96). According to Lars Schoultz, for example, the 
Good Neighbor represents only a tactical break with the interventionist past. 
While military incursions ended, Washington started to rely on local dictators 
to protect its interests during the 1930s. The war only strengthened these ties. 
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The U.S. supported the dictators in the interest of local stability and the dictators 
supported the U.S.  in order to be eligible for lend- lease aid, flexible trade and 
financial agreements, and prestigious United Nations status. After the war, the 
strong bonds with local military regimes “would facilitate the transmission of 
anticommunist values to Latin America” (Schoultz 310).
The wartime alliance of American republics, which eventually included 
every nation but Argentina, was undoubtedly a great diplomatic victory for 
the Roosevelt administration. However, Schoultz raises an important issue by 
drawing our attention to the fact that before, during, and after the war, the 
United States worked closely with authoritarian regimes, especially in Central 
America and the Caribbean. Yet, wartime diplomacy was not only an extension 
of earlier policies. It was mainly during the war itself that the celebrated non-
intervention principle was silently abandoned. Washington introduced new 
treaties for the use of Central American airfields and harbors; arrangements 
to share intelligence; assistance in the blacklisting of German economic inter-
ests; collaboration with local security forces, including the supply of lend- lease 
equipment; extensive propaganda campaigns to sell the purpose of the war 
to American allies; programs for the deportation of Axis nationals; and many 
more initiatives. During the war years, U.S.  legations (embassies from 1943 
onward) in Central America were expanded to be able to deal with the vast 
amounts of work relating to the war. Cultural attachés and FBI agents (“legal 
attachés”) were sent to all American republics to conduct propaganda pro-
grams and to gather intelligence on “non- American” activities. These men were 
joined by military instructors who were to ease the introduction of U.S. arma-
ments to the sister republics and economic advisors to wage economic war on 
Axis nationals. These new activities were also accompanied by more benign 
programs for the improvement of roads, hospitals, sewers, agricultural tech-
niques, and educational programs.2
Recent historical interpretations acknowledge that Washington abided by 
the nonintervention principle more or less faithfully through the 1930s, but 
2 An overview of State Department wartime programs can be found in:  John E.  Findling, 
Close Neighbors, Distant Friends:  United States- Central American Relations (Greenwood 
Press: New York, 1987),  chapter 5. For military programs, see: John Child, Unequal Alliance: The 
inter- American Military System, 1938– 1978 (Westview Press: Boulder, 1980), 27– 62. For an 
overview of cultural programs, see: Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign 
Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938– 1950 (Cambridge University Press:  New  York, 1981), 
35– 61. For local economic developments and the role of U.S. economic warfare, see: Bulmer- 
Thomas, Political Economy, 87– 100. Also consult references below for information on spe-
cific programs and activities.
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abandoned it during, rather than after the war. Max Paul Friedman argues 
that “overblown fears of an external threat to the hemisphere brought about 
the end of the Good Neighbor policy during the Second World War, not the 
Cold War.” As Friedman demonstrates, U.S.- German economic rivalry and 
exaggerated concerns for the existence of a Nazi “fifth column” in Latin 
America escalated into a U.S.- led deportation program during the war. Part 
of a broader program of economic warfare against German interests in the 
Western Hemisphere, thousands of Germans and Japanese and hundreds 
of Italians were deported from Latin American nations and interned in the 
United States on the mere assumption that they posed a threat to U.S. secu-
rity. Much like Schoultz, Friedman observes that it was the dictatorships of 
Latin America who were especially keen to cooperate with the United States. 
Many local strongmen used the program to their advantage as the proper-
ties of German deportees were expropriated, offering new opportunities for 
enrichment and graft. The democratic nations more carefully guarded their 
sovereignty against U.S.  interference and tried to protect the interests of 
deportees who were often long- time residents or citizens of the nations in 
question (Friedman 230).
U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America should be understood within this 
context of wartime interventionism. In order to strengthen “economic and 
cultural ties with Latin America and ensure hemispheric solidarity in the 
face of a growing Axis presence,” the Roosevelt administration founded the 
Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the 
American Republics (later Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs, 
or OCIAA). Headed by Nelson Rockefeller, the OCIAA initiated a range of proj-
ects, but it is best known for its cultural activities. Combining private initia-
tive with government coordination, the OCIAA promoted the dissemination of 
Hollywood movies, radio shows, news items, and printed materials throughout 
the continent. According to Uwe Lübken, policymakers regarded the cultural 
programs as a benign alternative to forceful intervention, which was still taboo 
under the Good Neighbor.3 When viewed in the context of other wartime pro-
grams, however, it is clear that OCIAA propaganda represents one side to a 
more interventionist policy.
3 Uwe Lübken, “Playing the Cultural Game:  The United States and Nazi Threat to Latin 
America,” in Cramer and Prutsch, ¡Américas Unidas!, 53– 76. For more information on the 
OCIAA, consult other articles in the aforementioned volume as well as: Darlene J. Sadlier, 
Americans All. Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy during World War II (University of Texas 
Press: Austin, 2012).
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The OCIAA headquarters in Washington relied on coordinating committees 
in each Latin American nation to adapt its programs to local contexts and to 
disseminate information through such sources as were available. Coordinating 
committees were established in Central America in 1942 and their staffs of 
volunteers were recruited from U.S.  businessmen with connections in local 
communities. Each committee worked with certain constraints, the most 
important of which were the interests that their voluntary staffs took in their 
task; the attitudes of the local government and the local U.S.  embassy; and 
the communications infrastructure of the host nation. In El Salvador, the most 
important obstacle to the committee’s effectiveness turned out to be the lim-
ited infrastructure of the country, especially outside of the capital city of San 
Salvador. The committee distributed news materials to newspaper, spread 
posters and pamphlets, offered scripts for radio programs, and showed mov-
ies, among a variety of smaller activities. However, due to poor transportation 
facilities and restricted radio ownership, the committee’s main audiences were 
the upper and middle classes of the capital.
According to Thomas Leonard, the OCIAA informational programs for 
Central America concentrated on “the military strength of the United States, its 
wealth, resources, and productive capacity; its traditional concept of freedom 
and tolerance, and its lack of imperialistic motives; its sincere effort toward 
improved social conditions for all; and the importance of culture in American 
life.” By mid- 1943, the coordinating committee in El Salvador had come to 
focus on the themes of inter- American solidarity and postwar economic and 
social ties. The U.S. ambassador in El Salvador also noted widespread atten-
tion for the Four Freedoms and Atlantic Charter, which were, “blazoned by us 
throughout El Salvador in the form of posters.” As the coordinating committees 
kept careful track of their audience’s main interests, we know that the middle 
and upper classes in Central America expected a postwar world with strong 
ties to the United States and the possibility of greater participation in more 
democratic governments. Whether those expectations were directly linked to 
U.S. programs, is, in the words of Leonard, one of “the most perplexing aspects” 
of the coordinating committees’ work.4
4 The discussion of the OCIAA in El Salvador is based on: Thomas M. Leonard, “The OIAA in 
Central America,” in Cramer and Prutsch, ¡Américas Unidas!, 283– 312. The quotation of the 
U.S. ambassador is from: Ambassador Walter Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 
1123, December 30, 1943, National Archives of the United States at College Park, MD, Record 
Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Legation in San 
Salvador [henceforth: PRES], box 82, class 800: Salvador.
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As the OCIAA set up its activities, Central America’s small middle sector 
was expanding and asserting itself. Through natural increase and rural- urban 
migration, the middle sector had become an identifiable element in the popu-
lations of Central American capitals by the 1940s. However, this growing class 
was not represented in the political system. In El Salvador, upwardly mobile 
groups such as university students and junior military officers saw their social 
advancement cut short by the Martínez regime, which was dominated by a 
stagnant and aging group of senior officers and government officials. During 
the war, moreover, economic growth in Central America’s urban centers fell 
behind due to the decline in commerce, causing further frustration for middle 
sector groups. These social and economic factors combined with the “espousal 
of the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt’s Four Freedom” would add up to “a pow-
erful case for political change,” according to Victor Bulmer- Thomas. The devel-
oping middle class opposition movement was “heartened” by the idealism of 
the war, Patricia Parkman finds, because it conferred respectability and legiti-
macy to its ambitions.5
As the United States fought the dictators of Europe and the OCIAA spread 
its propaganda about political freedoms and socio- economic improvements, 
Washington worked closely with several dictators in Latin America. U.S. policy-
makers did not perceive this paradox until it was pointed out to them by local 
oppositionists (on which more below). Through the early years of the war the 
cooperative attitude of Central American dictators was actually instrumental 
in allowing U.S. diplomats to uphold the fiction that the nonintervention pol-
icy was still valid. Authoritarian regimes had been established throughout the 
hemisphere following the economic and social turmoil of the Great Depression. 
In Central America, Jorge Ubico (1931– 1944) came to power in Guatemala, 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1931– 1944) in El Salvador, Tiburcio Carías 
Andino (1932– 1948) in Honduras, and Anastasio Somoza García (1936– 1956) 
in Nicaragua. The strongmen of the Caribbean were Rafael Trujillo (1930– 
1961) of the Dominican Republic and Fulgencio Batista of Cuba (1933– 1959). 
Having adopted the nonintervention policy, Washington did not contest the 
rise of dictatorship in its sphere of influence, although Friedman argues that 
5 Bulmer- Thomas, Political Economy, 100– 104, quote on 101; Parkman, Nonviolent Insurrection, 
30– 45, quote on 32– 33. Victor Hugo Acuña Ortega adds an important caveat to these find-
ings, showing that some middle class groups had a vested interest in the continuation of 
the authoritarian state:  Victor Hugo Acuña Ortega, “The Formation of the Urban Middle 
Sectors in El Salvador, 1910– 1944,” in Aldo Lauria- Santiago and Leigh Binford, Landscapes 
of Struggle:  Politics, Society, and Community in El Salvador (University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2004), 39– 49.
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the dictators’ pro- American attitude and status- quo policies made it easier for 
the United States to assume the role of a good neighbor (Frieman 230). In any 
event, all were staunch allies of the U.S. during World War II.
Many programs that were deemed essential to the war effort in the Americas 
could only be accomplished with the consent or active collaboration of local 
governments, whether they were democratic or authoritarian. Economic war-
fare against German companies, for example, could only be executed through 
cooperation with the local governments— to the point where the U.S. legation 
in Guatemala prepared the laws that the local government needed to imple-
ment to make economic warfare possible.6 While the rhetorical commitment 
to the Good Neighbor remained, new definitions and justifications were neces-
sary to harmonize wartime activities with a supposed attitude of noninterven-
tion. In 1941, for example, U.S. Minister to El Salvador Robert Frazer argued 
that encouraging Salvadoran newspapers to print “solidarity- of- the- Americans 
propaganda” did not constitute intervention: “[T] o regard the exercise of such 
an influence [over the Salvadoran press] as circumscribing their independence 
is, we think, perhaps an extreme view. As a matter of fact, the entire press of 
Salvador is pro- Pan- American anyhow, so that no paper would be violating 
its principles or sacrificing its ideals by printing [U.S. propaganda].”7 Frazer’s 
argument is ingenious, since the Salvadoran press was strictly censored by the 
Martínez regime.
Interestingly, the Department of State became concerned about the 
“impression” prevalent in some Latin American countries that the United 
States had “abandoned its popular nonintervention policy during the War.” 
The Axis nations were using this sentiment to their advantage, the Department 
believed, with propaganda about “Yankee Imperialism”: “The pretext for this 
propaganda is the increasing activity of this government in various enterprises 
on the soil of the other American republics: the construction and operation 
of military and naval bases, the Proclaimed List, deportations, a wide variety 
of economic operations (ranging from the war- connected rubber programs to 
projects with a pronounced ‘welfare’ aspect, such as the health and sanitation 
program).”
6 John Moors Cabot, memorandum, October 17, 1941, National Archives of the United States, 
College Park, MD, Record Group 59: Department of State Lot Files [henceforth: Lot Files], 
entry 211: Individual Countries [henceforth: entry 211], box 46, folder marked Guatemala, 
1936– 1942.
7 Minister Robert Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 1437, July 2, 1941, PRES, Strictly 
Confidential Files [henceforth: SCF], box 5, class 891: Public Press.
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The Department patently rejected the notion that such activities were acts 
of intervention: “After all, intervention on behalf of special groups in the United 
States [a reference to business interests] has not been revived.” Furthermore, 
all U.S. activities were executed on the basis of “collaboration” and “what can 
honestly be described as [the] interests of the whole hemisphere.” This turned 
out to be the magic formula. As long as local collaborators could be found and 
as long as the objectives of the United States could be described as serving a 
common cause, the Department was not, in fact, intervening:  “We must get 
off the defensive. The expression ‘nonintervention’ should give way to ‘collab-
oration’, as a sign of changed conditions.”8 Although it was not acknowledged 
at the time, the problem remained that local collaborators might use their 
connections to U.S. programs to increase their own power and prestige. Also, 
there was no democratic method by which the definition of the “common 
good” could be established— the State Department would take it upon itself 
to determine that.
In their search for local “collaborators,” U.S.  legations in Central America 
relied more and more on their association with the local dictatorships. In the 
wartime context, the military dictators of Central America turned out to be 
peculiarly useful allies. Not only were they particularly keen to follow U.S. 
 policies, they also had standing armies, intelligence networks, permissive laws 
against subversion, and propaganda machines that could— with a little help 
and direction from the United States— be employed to fight the perceived fifth 
column threat. The only liberal country in Central America, Costa Rica, was 
at a disadvantage in this regard: “German and Italian activities in Costa Rica 
date from the very beginning of the Nazi and fascist regimes in Germany and 
Italy. This is accounted for by the fact that […] the Government of Costa Rica is 
democratic in every sense of the word and activities could therefore be carried 
on without any hindrance.”9 Ironically then, the most democratic republic of 
the isthmus was most vulnerable to totalitarian subversion.
The argument that the United States supports right- wing dictatorships to 
maintain stability and security in its sphere of influence is well- known (see 
Schmitz 1999). The experience of the war strengthened that tendency in spe-
cific ways. U.S. diplomats developed new justifications for collaborating with 
8 “Propaganda about Relations between this Government and the other American Republics,” 
September 17, 1942, Lot Files, American Republic Affairs, entry 214:  Miscellaneous 
Memorandums, January 4, 1938 to September 12, 1947 [henceforth:  entry  214], box 66, 
folder marked Chapin and Toop, 1941 to December 1942.
9 Cabot, Strictly Confidential Memorandum for Mr. Overton G. Ellis, n.d. (September, 1941), 
PRES, SCF, box 42, volume VI, class 500: Congresses and Conferences.
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dictatorships in the context of a global crisis and a local fifth column threat. 
Such justifications would reemerge during the Cold War. The authoritarian 
regimes in Central America benefitted from military missions and FBI instruc-
tors who were sent to Central America to train the local security forces in the 
use of modern weapons, intelligence gathering, and surveillance— increasing 
the regimes’ capability to control their own populations.10 The OCIAA financed 
the dictators’ official press and supplied upbeat “information” about the war 
and the United Nations— thus strengthening the impression that the dictators 
were important allies of the United States. Economic advisors helped the local 
authorities to nationalize German interest— giving the regimes new sources 
for graft and illegal enrichment. U.S. engineers built roads, sewers, hospitals, 
and schools with U.S. funds— but the local leaders claimed that the new ser-
vices were the result of their modernizing policies.
This complex interplay of developments on international and national 
levels— U.S. wartime interventionism, including the propaganda activities of the 
OCIAA, and the existence of a friendly dictatorship, together with an expanding, 
restless middle class— would shape the meaning of World War II in El Salvador. 
Throughout the war years, the Martínez regime and local oppositionists com-
peted with each other to lay claim to the war on fascism in order to translate 
their goals to U.S. diplomats. That process began even before the United States 
entered the war. In September, 1941, a group of former government employ-
ees, urban professionals, and young intellectuals formed two new organiza-
tions:  The Acción Democrática Salvadoreña (Salvadoran Democratic Action, 
ADS) and the Juventud Democrática Salvadoreña (Democratic Salvadoran 
Youth, JDS). Formally, these were not political parties, but civic organizations 
that wished to support the Allied cause by promoting democratic ideals and 
counteracting the spread of totalitarianism. The regime was not duped, how-
ever. Shortly after the founding of said organizations, the Salvadoran minister 
of foreign affairs visited U.S. Minister Frazer to warn him that ADS and JDS 
were in fact anti- government parties and therefore, naturally, communis-
tic and pro- Nazi. The Martínez government was somewhat embarrassed by 
the situation because it was on record as promoting democracy and oppos-
ing totalitarianism itself, but, argued the president and the foreign minister, 
10 John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus 
(Maxwell Macmillian: New York, 1994), 45– 48 argues that U.S. military aid significantly 
increased the power and the prestige of local military establishments. Leonard argues that 
the influence of U.S. military aid was slight: Thomas M. Leonard, “Central America: On 
the Periphery,” in Leonard and John F.  Bratzel eds., Latin America during World War II 
(Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2007), 50– 53.
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the present world crisis required unity and patriotism in the face of threats. 
If the members of ADS and JDS were genuinely interested in the defense of 
democracy, they could join El Salvador’s sole legal party: the Partido Nacional 
Pro- Patria. The fact that they did not proved that they were only interested in 
creating division. Some weeks later, ADS and JDS were outlawed.11
The U.S. legation had witnessed opposition to the Martínez regime before, 
most notably in 1932 when indigenous communities in western El Salvador 
rebelled, subsequently to be massacred by government troops (see Anderson 
2001). These episodes had generally been disregarded by U.S.  diplomats as 
being purely local affairs. This time it was different, because the members of 
ADS and JDS were not peasants, professional politicians, or disgruntled army 
officers, but former government officials, physicians, lawyers, and professors— 
in a word, close friends and acquaintances of the legation.12 Moreover, in the 
parlance of democracy, the new organizations found a theme that related to 
traditional Salvadoran civic culture, the interests of its middle class support-
ers, and the war against fascism. Frazer reported to the Department that it was 
ridiculous to characterize ADS as communist or pro- Nazi, as the local govern-
ment did, because its members were “all prominent, conservative and patriotic. 
Most of them are known to have resigned office because, although formerly in 
full accord with the President [Martínez], they disagree with the extension of 
his presidential term and his continuation of a de facto dictatorship.” When, 
in October, the government formally restricted the right of assembly and pre-
sented this as a measure to deal with enemy activities, Frazer reported that the 
11 Francisci Lime to Frazer, September 19, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, class 800:  Accion 
Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 1715, September 22, 1941, 
PRES, SCF, box 4, class 800:  Accion Democratica; Frazer, Memorandum on Visits by 
Drs Araujo and Avila re New Democratic Parties, September 23, 1941, PRES, SCF, 
box 4, class 800:  Accion Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 
1720, September 24, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, class 800:  Accion Democratica; Frazer 
to the Secretary of State, despatch 1727, September 24, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, class 
800: Accion Democratica.
12 Later in the war, Ambassador Walter Thurston and members of his embassy would 
describe known members of the opposition as “competent,” “outstanding,” and “highly 
reputed” attorneys, journalists, and engineers. They were also described as “pro- 
American” and “friends of the embassy,” several of whom had visited the United States 
on official exchanges or had studied there. Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 
1156, January 8, 1944, PRES, box 98, volume XIII, class 800: Salvador. General; Thurston 
to the Secretary of State, despatch 1351, March 2, 1944, PRES, box 98, volume XIII, class 
800: Salvador. General; Ellis, Confidential Memorandum for the Ambassador, March 14, 
1944, PRES, box 98, volume XIII, class 800: Salvador. General.
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decree was obviously directed at “legitimate” opposition such as that of ADS 
and that it was enacted “in spite of President Martínez’ reiterated statements 
of his belief in and support for democracy.”13
Notwithstanding Frazer’s reports, only the middle level of the Department 
demonstrated a passing interest in the matter. The suppression of ADS and 
JDS almost coincided with the United States’ formal entry into the war. When 
former members of the, now illegal, ADS visited Frazer at the legation on 
December 18, only 11 days after Pearl Harbor, the minister could not help but 
sympathize with those “sincere men of high ideals, actuated by unselfish, patri-
otic motives.” They left a manifesto with the minister that expounded their 
ideals, perhaps in a last effort to involve U.S. diplomats in their conflict with 
the regime. Writing his report on the meeting that evening, Frazer regretfully 
noted that there was nothing more he could do to help, since the Department 
had already been notified about the situation but, under the circumstances, 
could not act “without indulging in improper criticism of President Martínez’ 
administration.” “This memorandum, therefore, is being filed merely to com-
plete the records.”14
Minister Frazer’s experience with ADS and JDS is indicative of attempts by 
Central American actors, both representatives of the regime and its opposi-
tion, to appropriate the language of the World War and to use it, successfully 
at times, to translate their own politics to U.S. diplomats in a way that would 
elicit attention and sympathy. It was already noted how the experience of war 
led U.S. diplomats to construct new justifications for their cooperation with 
Latin American dictators in their fight against European dictators. It should be 
stressed, however, that local leaders like Martínez actively contributed to the 
construction of that perception.
In early 1943, for example, Martínez told the newly arrived U.S. ambassador, 
Walter Thurston, that “liberty” in El Salvador was not the kind of liberty that 
a North American might be used to— playing up to U.S. prejudices regarding 
Latin Americans’ “political maturity” and implicitly rejecting the applicability 
13 Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 1720, September 24, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, 
class 800: Accion Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 1740, October 
3, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, class 800: Accion Democratica.
14 Secretary of State to Frazer, instruction 464, October 8, 1941, PRES, box 4, class 
800:  Government; Frazer to the Secretary of State, despatch 1777, October 16, 1941, 
PRES, box 4, class 801:  Government; Frazer, Memorandum on Call at Legation of 
Dr. Francisco A. Lima and Six Other Members of the Central American Committee of the 
Acción Democrática Salvadoreña, December 18, 1941, PRES, SCF, box 4, class 800: Accion 
Democratica.
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of the Four Freedoms to El Salvador. At the same time, the regime tried to con-
vince the population that the United States supported it. In his weekly speeches, 
which were themselves modelled on Roosevelt’s fireside chats, Martínez reg-
ularly referred to wartime cooperation and the many U.S. projects to improve 
roads, sanitation, and agriculture in El Salvador— suggesting that his regime 
provided an irreplaceable link between Salvadorans and Washington’s lar-
gesse. Complementing the government’s public propaganda was a “whisper-
ing campaign”:  planted rumors that suggested that the United States would 
never accept a change of regime during the war. Naturally, Martínez needed 
some more substantial signs of U.S. support to back up his claims. So, on July 7, 
Thurston was officially invited to attend a banquet in Santa Anna in honor of 
Martínez, which turned out to be the official kick- off of Martínez’ latest reelec-
tion campaign. The embassy found out about the real purpose of the banquet 
when it was too late to decline the formal invitation outright without caus-
ing something of a diplomatic scandal. Even more deviously, the Salvadoran 
regime attempted to get a U.S. fiat for constitutional changes that were nec-
essary to keep Martínez in power beyond 1944 by claiming that a review of 
the country’s first law was necessary to allow for the expropriation and sale of 
“Axis” possessions in El Salvador.15
15 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1, January 14, 1943, PRES, box 76, class 
123: Thurston; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 214, March 23, 1943, PRES, 
box 82, class 802.1: Executive Departments; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 
259, April 6, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 802.1: Executive Departments; Thurston to the 
Secretary of State, despatch 269, April 8, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 802.1:  Executive 
Departments; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 115, February 19, 1943, 
PRES, box 82, class 803: Legislative Branch; Ellis to Thurston, September 9, 1943, PRES, 
SCF, box 8, volume I, class 800: El Salvador; Gerhard Gade, untitled memorandum, July 
19, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, des-
patch 624, July 19, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800:  El Salvador; Thurston to Mauricio 
Callardo, July 24, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 800: El Salvador; Thurston to 
the Secretary of State, despatch 618, July 28, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 
800: El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 498, June 26, 1943, PRES, 
SCF, box 8, volume I, class 711.3: Proclaimed List; Acting Secretary of State to Thurston, 
instruction 259, July 27, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 711.3: Proclaimed List; 
Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 966, November 16, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, 
volume I, class 711.3: Proclaimed List; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1080, 
December 16, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 711.3: Proclaimed List; Thurston 
to the Secretary of State, despatch 1119, December 29, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, 
class 711.3: Proclaimed List.
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The underground, middle class opposition movement also aligned its goals 
with those of the war and also sought the support of the U.S. embassy. Trying 
to avoid censorship, the opposition press published editorials and open 
 letters to President Roosevelt on the ideals of the United Nations while, in the 
 opinion of Ambassador Thurston, “transparently alluding to local conditions.” 
Oppositionists visited the ambassador and sent him letters and memoranda on 
the  establishment of civic societies in support of the fight against fascism. While 
many of those communications were careful to avoid direct criticism of the 
regime, others were more explicit in their assertion that the Martínez  government 
was a  despotism “equal in pride and vanity to those we fight abroad.”16
Toward the end of 1943, a local student organization, the Frente Democrático 
Universitario (University Democratic Front, FDU), attempted to involve the 
embassy more directly in its protests against the regime. On December 4, the 
students presented a plan to Thurston to hold a parade on the anniversary of 
Pearl Harbor, supposedly to demonstrate their support for the Four Freedoms 
and Atlantic Charter and their solidarity with the people of the United States. 
The students asked the embassy for U.S. flags, pictures of President Roosevelt, 
and posters about the Four Freedoms to brighten their parade. The march 
would end at the embassy and its climax would be a speech in support of the 
United States, which (in its eventual form) called on “Latin American citizens” 
to “vigorously fight” the transplantation of fascism “on our continent.”17
Thurston’s natural inclination as an experienced “Good Neighbor” was to 
avert all attempts to draw him into local politics— which he did with consid-
erable skill. On the one hand, the ambassador discouraged the “scoundrels” of 
the regime to seek his help. Being unable to ignore the invitation to the govern-
ment’s banquet in Santa Anna outright, Thurston convinced the organizers that 
pressing matters prevented his attendance and sent two lower ranking officers 
in his place. Seeing through the regime’s ploy to involve the embassy in a reform 
16 J. Cipriano Castro to Thurston, June 20, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Political Affairs, 
Salvador (translation from Spanish by the author). The 1943 files contain many oppo-
sition letters and embassy reports on opposition activity. For a non- exhaustive sample 
covering the month of September, see: “El Pueblo Salvadoreño” to Thurston, September 
4, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador; Asociacion Nacional Democrática to Thurston, 
September 21, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador; Frente Magisterial Democrático to 
Thurston, September 28, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador.
17 Rafael Eguizábal h. et al. to Thurston, December 4, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador; 
“Discurso pronunciado ante la estatua de la Libertad por el Sr. Rafael Eguizábal h., a 
nombre del Frente Democrático Universitario, con occasion del homenaje a los Estados 
Unidos de América, el 11 de diciembre de 1943,” PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador (trans-
lations from Spanish by the author).
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of the constitution, the embassy informed authorities that the United States 
had requested no changes to the constitution; that Salvadoran laws enabling 
the prosecution of the war were deemed adequate; and that the government 
should make no attempt to convey the impression that the United States was 
in any way involved with the contemplated revisions. Perhaps Thurston’s most 
significant action was to cancel the shipment of 1,000 U.S. sub- machineguns 
to the Salvadoran government. Navy intelligence had informed the legation 
that these weapons would probably be distributed to members of Pro Patria, to 
be used against the opposition in imitation of the 1932 massacre.18
Having deflected the regime’s attempts to draw his embassy into local 
politics, Thurston felt that he had to take the same position in his dealings 
with the opposition. Thus, the ambassador often received oppositionists 
personally and politely listened to their criticism of the government, only to 
inform them that he was completely neutral in the matter. The case of the 
student demonstration offered something of a challenge since its purported 
intention was to support the allied cause. Initially, the ambassador informed 
the students that he appreciated their initiative, but that he could not sup-
port their parade of December 8, as President Roosevelt had recently vetoed 
a bill proposing to commemorate the yearly anniversary of Pearl Harbor. 
Having no intention to give up that easily, the students informed Thurston 
that they would happily postpone their parade to December 11, the day 
that war was declared on fascism. This time, Thurston could only offer the 
rather thin excuse that he wished all manner of celebration to be called off 
until final victory in the war was secure. Without the embassy’s patronage, 
the student parade, intended to be a grand affair with much waving of the 
Salvadoran and U.S. flags, turned out to be a modest gathering of some 400 
nervous students (one sixth of whom, in the estimate of the U.S.  military 
attaché, were actually undercover policemen). While the government did 
not break up the supposedly pro- allied demonstration, some of the student 
18 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 430, June 4, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 
800: Salvador; Thurston to Callardo, July 24, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 800: El 
Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 618, July 28, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 
8, volume I, class 800: El Salvador; Thurston, untitled memorandum, June 21, 1943, PRES, 
SCF, box 8, volume I, class 800: El Salvador; D.V.R., Memorandum on Projected Reform 
of the Salvadoran Constitution, June 29, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume I, class 800: El 
Salvador; Maleady to the Secretary of State, telegram 150, July 20, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 
8, volume II, class 824: Equipment and Supplies; Major C.P. Baldwin to Thurston, July 23, 
1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume II, class 824: Equipment and Supplies; Lieutenant R.W. 
Rastetter to Thurston, August 26, 1943, PRES, SCF, box 8, volume II, class 824: Equipment 
and Supplies.
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leaders were spirited away by what oppositionists had come to describe, 
tellingly, as the Gestapo Martínista. The disappointed students would later 
impress upon Thurston the analogies between Martínez’ action and those of 
the European dictators and asked the ambassador’s help to firmly implant 
the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter (“los Cuatro Libertades del 
Atlántico”) in El Salvador.19
The failure of Salvadoran students to obtain the embassy’s patronage did 
not mark the end of oppositionists’ attempts to draw the United States into 
their local war with dictatorship. However, the tone of their communications 
became increasingly bitter. Through a local U.S. businessman named Winall 
Dalton, Thurston was in touch with several Salvadoran oppositionists who 
observed that while the State Department would not intervene against the 
dictators, it had in fact intervened on many occasions during the war and 
therefore had a “moral responsibility” toward the Salvadoran opposition. The 
United States, Dalton’s friends said, had intervened to keep Nazi- sympathizers 
from being appointed to government offices; to deport Axis nationals and liq-
uidate their property; to protect U.S. economic interests; to plant pro- Allied 
information in the papers and to supply lend- lease weapons to the regime. 
Furthermore, Minister Frazer had publically defended the Martínez regime 
and its cooperative stance during the war and had allowed the dictator to 
adopt the pro- democratic language of the war while he was in effect a “nazi- 
fascist.” Aside from the political and economic angle:
You intervened, with sincere sentiments we desire to believe, to give us 
sewers and modern slaughterhouses, swimming pools and bridges, high-
ways and schoolchildren feeding- programs. WHY? […] We have had no 
voice in accepting these gifts you have brought. You have dealt with the 
illegal government your legation helped to perpetuate and your country 
19 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1070, December 13, 1943, PRES, box 82, 
class 800: Salvador; Thurston, untitled memorandum, September 8, 1943, PRES, box 82, 
class 800: Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 955, November 12, 1943, 
PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador; Thurston to Eguizábal h., December 4, 1943, PRES, box 
82, class 800: Salvador; Eguizábal h. to Thurston, December 6, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 
800:  Salvador; Thurston, untitled memorandum, December 11, 1943, PRES, box 82, 
class 800:  Salvador; Eguizábal h.  to Thurston, December 13, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 
800:  Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1070, December 13, 1943, 
PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador; G.B. Massey to Thurston, December 14, 1943, PRES, box 
82, class 800: Salvador; Oswaldo Escobar Velado and Eguizábal h. to Thurston, December 
13, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador.
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has sustained by recognition. We resent this Good Neighbor program of 
yours— we do not want charity and you offend us by extending it. You are 
a great and powerful people— why do you give us sewers but aid in the 
denial of Human Rights?
Dalton’s letters on behalf of the opposition represent the gap that had come 
to exist between the United States’ experience of fighting a war for democracy 
and the Central American experience of living under a U.S. supported dicta-
torship. “Will it not be shameful for you Americans to see our people mowed 
down by your General Grant tanks? Could you not find a better and honorable 
use for them— or scrap them if you have too many?,” this letter pleaded, “To 
whom do you pretend to be a Good Neighbor? To the dictator or to the people 
of El Salvador?”20
Salvadoran oppositionists did not ask the ambassador to put a halt to 
U.S. intervention. Rather, they pointed out that the United States should take 
responsibility for the ways in which it was influencing Salvadoran politics and 
acknowledge the promises it had made in the Atlantic Charter and the Four 
Freedoms. For example, an unnamed Salvadoran attorney, “whose friendship 
for the United States is not open to doubt,” told a member of the embassy in 
a private conversation that “he considered the avowed policy of the United 
States not to interfere in the internal policies of the Latin American countries 
as prejudicial to the cause of democracy and liberty […] asserting that thereby, 
the United States encouraged dictatorships in power.” Rather, this Salvadoran 
believed that Washington should institute a policy of non- recognition of dicta-
tors. A manager of an independent (though censored) newspaper volunteered 
to a member of the embassy the “feelings of resentment and frustration” that 
his colleagues felt about the way in which U.S. activities in El Salvador were 
“allowed to be converted to the prestige of the Martínez administration.” 
According to this newspaperman, the publishers of the independent newspa-
pers had considered a “declaration of war” on the U.S. by refusing to publish 
the materials of the OCIAA. On another occasion however, the pressmen had 
considered to remind Nelson Rockefeller of the cooperation that they had fur-
nished to him and to insist that he help them in return by getting Washington 
to withdraw its diplomatic recognition of the regime.21
20 Winnall A. Dalton to Thurston, December 28, 1943, PRES, box 82, class 800: Salvador.
21 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1123, December 30, 1943, PRES, box 82, 
class 800: Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1156, January 8, 1944, 
PRES, box 98, volume XIII, class 800:  Salvador. General; R.T.S., confidential memoran-
dum, March 10, 1944, PRES, box 98, volume XIII, class 800: Salvador. General.
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In January 1944, the coordinating committee in El Salvador also concluded 
that Washington’s collaboration with Martínez impaired U.S. prestige, though 
it is not clear whether the activities of local oppositionists had any role to play 
in the formation of that view. At any rate, Ambassador Thurston could no 
longer ignore the issue. In a report to the Department, Thurston wrote with 
apparent surprise that “[o] ur pronouncements such as the Atlantic Charter 
and the Declaration of the Four Freedoms (the latter blazoned by us through-
out El Salvador in the form of posters) are accepted literally by the Salvadorans 
as official endorsement of basic democratic principles which we desire to 
have prevail currently and universally.” Salvadorans could not reconcile these 
pronouncements, the ambassador continued, with U.S.  collaboration with 
the dictators of the American continent. As Thurston now understood the 
 problem, “[t]he principle defect of a policy of non- intervention accompanied 
by propaganda on behalf of democratic doctrines simultaneously stimulates 
dictatorships and popular opposition to them.” He counseled the Department 
to consider this dilemma, cautioning that “a problem of this complex nature is 
not susceptible of ready solution and the most that should be attempted at this 
time is an empirical search for improvements and careful study of plans for a 
revision of policy after the war.”22
Unfortunately for Thurston, Salvadorans would not await the outcomes of 
careful study. In May 1944, following a failed military uprising, a revolution 
started with a student strike that spread throughout the capital, gradually para-
lyzing the city. Remembered as the huelga de los caídos brazos (sit- down strike) 
the protests were a successfully executed campaign of non- violent resistance 
against state terror (see Parkman 1988). Initially, Martínez belittled the signif-
icance of the insurrection and blamed it on “agitators employing well- known 
Nazi war- of- nerves tactics.” Ultimately, he tried to strike back by bringing 
armed peasants to the city. Martínez’ cabinet ministers and advisors managed 
to convince the president not to let the situation escalate, however, and the 
 latter decided to step down. The president’s retirement was announced over 
the national radio on May 9, and power was transferred to a provisional govern-
ment under the leadership of Minister of Defense Andrés Ignacio Menéndez. 
The opposition, which was not entirely satisfied by Menéndez’ appointment, 
kept up the pressure for some days, until Martínez fled to Guatemala and the 
interim government announced its intention, in the language of the war, to 
govern “according to the norms of the most ample democracy, guaranteeing 
22 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1154, January 8, 1944, PRES, box 98, volume 
XIII, class 800: El Salvador.
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the Four Freedoms proclaimed by Mr. Roosevelt.” While the U.S.  had taken 
no active part in the change of government, Salvadorans closely identified 
Martínez’ resignation with the war effort: “Four Freedoms posters and impro-
vised variations thereon were carried throughout the city by the multitude 
celebrating the occasion. Several demonstrations— some small and some 
numbering several thousand— paraded to [the U.S.] Embassy cheering the 
United States.”23
The Salvadoran experiment with democracy lasted for only four months, 
but was characterized by feverish activity. Some ten political parties were 
formed— or came out into the open— in the two months after Martínez’ 
downfall. Some were radical, some reactionary, but all referred in some way 
or another to the democratic ideology of the war.24 New newspapers were 
23 Thurston to the Secretary of State, telegram 136, May 5, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, 
class 800:  El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, telegram 141, May 7, 1944, 
PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800:  El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, 
telegram 152, May 9, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800:  El Salvador; A.F.M., 
memorandum on political situation, May 10, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: 
El Salvador; Thurston to Boaz Long, May 11, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: El 
Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, telegram 159, May 11, 1944, PRES, box 99, 
volume XIV, class 800: El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1555, 
May 12, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary 
of State, despatch 1557, May 12, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: Salvador. 
General; Parkman, Nonviolent Insurrection, especially 62
24 This trend is noticable in the names of the new parties:  Unión Democrática Nacional, 
Partido Emancipación Nacional, Frente Popular Salvadoreño, Partido Unión Demócrata, 
Partido del Pueblo Salvadoreño, Frente Social Republicano, Partido Fraternal Progresista, 
and Partido Unificación Social Democrática. Not all parties were as progressive as their 
names suggested: Partido Fraternal Progresista, for example, was led by an old caudillo 
while Partido Unificación Social Democrática represented conservative coffee interests. 
It is indicative of the prestige of democratic principles that even the old coffee barons 
felt obliged to acknowledge it in the name of their party. Thurston to the Secretary of 
State, despatch 1628, May 26, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800:  Salvador. 
General; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1644, May 29, 1944, PRES, box 99, 
volume XIV, class 800:  Salvador. General; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 
1648, May 29, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: Salvador. General; Thurston 
to the Secretary of State, despatch 1658, May 31, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 
800: Salvador. General; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1662, June 2, 1944, 
PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: Salvador. General; Thurston to the Secretary of State, 
despatch 1687, June 5, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800:  Salvador. General; 
Gerhard Gade to the Secretary of State, despatch 1753, June 22, 1944, PRES, box 99, vol-
ume XIV, class 800: Salvador. General; Gade to the Secretary of State, despatch 1756, June 
24, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: Salvador. General.
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published while existing newspapers began to express editorial comments 
freely, one such paper announcing that “The triumph of the United States of 
North America is our triumph. It signifies our independence.”25 The revolution 
in El Salvador was part of a broader development throughout Latin America. 
Several long- lived dictatorships were toppled by opposition movements that 
were at least partly inspired by U.S.  wartime propaganda. Jumping on the 
bandwagon, the Department of State initially expressed careful satisfaction 
with the trend and, in 1945, it instituted its own policy of denouncing “dic-
tatorships and disreputable governments” in Latin America. Unfortunately, 
right- wing forces would reassert their power quickly, so that, by the beginning 
of the Cold War, many Latin American countries were under the sway of con-
servative and military governments.26
The democratic revolution in El Salvador was ended in October 1944, 
by an army coup led by Colonel Osmín Aguirre y Salinas, a veteran of the 
1932 slaughter and, in the view of the U.S. embassy, a fascist- sympathizer. 
Under pressure from local opponents and the United States, which initially 
refused to extend recognition to the new regime, Aguirre stepped aside for 
another president, but the liberal factions of El Salvador would not regain 
their strength after the October coup. Aguirre’s brief sway did lead to an 
important and perhaps definite break between the U.S.  embassy and the 
democratic opposition. In March 1945, just days before Aguirre would step 
down, the Department of State decided to recognize the regime in order to 
be able to invite the Salvadoran government for a meeting of the American 
ministers of Foreign Affairs in Mexico.27 From Washington’s  perspective, 
the conference in Mexico was an important step in its evolving postwar 
policy toward Latin America, but many Salvadorans were shocked that the 
United States chose to work with a man of Aguirre’s background. In the 
days and weeks after recognition, the embassy in San Salvador received 
hate mail in such quantities that a separate file marked “protests against 
recognition” was created in its archives. Many letters accused the United 
States of  fascist policies; some contained more traditional denunciations 
25 Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1557, May 12, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume 
XIV, class 800: Salvador. General; Thurston to the Secretary of State, despatch 1576, May 
17, 1944, PRES, box 99, volume XIV, class 800: Salvador. General.
26 Bethell and Roxborough, “The Postwar Conjuncture,” 2, 5, and 18– 19.
27 Cabot to Messersmith, December 21, 1944, Lot Files, entry 211, box 46, folder marked 
El Salvador, 1940– 1947; Messersmith, Memorandum on Telephone Conversation with 
Toriello, February 14, 1945, Lot Files, entry 211, box 46, folder marked El Salvador, 
1940– 1947.
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of “Yankee imperialism”; at least one letter was accompanied by a picture 
of Franklin Roosevelt adorned with swastikas.28 While the fact that the 
Salvadoran opposition, as an organized body, never regained its old strength 
must have played a role in the development, it is noteworthy to observe that 
throughout the following years there was very little contact between the 
U.S. embassy and oppositionists.
At that time, the new U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, John Farr Simmons, 
still considered the group of “forward- looking liberals, small in number 
but strongly influenced by Jeffersonian concepts of democracy,” to be the 
best hope for El Salvador’s future. It was fortunate that these “liberals” were 
“more articulate” than in any other Central American countries and that 
they patterned their “ideals upon the democratic processes of our country.” 
However, their “liking and respect for the United States [suffered] a severe 
setback at the time of our recognition of the Aguirre regime.” If the United 
States was serious about its policy against “disreputable governments,” 
Simmons argued, the liberal element in El Salvador “should be given every 
encouragement [because] in the long run, [it] is our greatest hope for the 
future in the gradual establishment in this country of what we understand 
as the democratic process.” This advice came too late. Over the course of 
the next years, the Salvadoran military strengthened its grip on the coun-
try while Washington’s tolerance for political experimentation in Latin 
America declined as the Cold War set in.
U.S.  diplomats never fully grasped what meaning the ideals of World 
War II, sold locally by the OCIAA, had for Salvadorans. Ambassador Walter 
Thurston understood how both the Martínez regime and local opposition-
ists claimed the war. The former stressed the need for solidarity and stability 
and used the expropriation of “Axis” properties as an excuse to tamper with 
the constitution. The latter pushed the analogy between the fight against 
European dictatorship and its own fight against dictatorship. Thurston 
believed that by adhering to the traditional nonintervention  policy, he could 
avoid being entangled in local politics. However, the nonintervention policy 
was, to all intents and purposes, a fiction by 1943. The State Department 
itself emphasized “collaboration” for the “common good,” fully aware of 
the fact that this would mean cooperation with dictatorship in many Latin 
American countries. Liberally- minded Salvadorans came to resent U.S. 
 wartime programs, including the democratically flavored propaganda of the 
OCIAA, because they could not harmonize what was to them obviously an 
28 PRES, box 119, Volume XVII, class 800: Salvador. Protest against Recognition.
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interventionist policy with the ambassador’s refusal, based on the noninter-
vention principle, to distance his country from the Martínez regime.
By 1944, Thurston came to believe that a nonintervention policy com-
bined with propaganda in favor of democracy stimulated both dictatorship 
and opposition against it. By framing the issue in these terms, however, 
Thurston revealed how far apart he and Salvadoran oppositionists really were. 
Firstly, the many letters that the embassy received from local oppositionists 
reveal that they did not regard nonintervention, by itself, as the central problem. 
The real problem was that U.S. wartime programs benefited the dictatorship of 
Martínez. Secondly, it is unlikely, as Thurston believed, that pro- democratic 
propaganda caused opposition to Martínez. Neither did Salvadoran opposi-
tionists ever recognize the United States as the source of their ideals. Rather, 
they adopted the language of the war in their communications with U.S. dip-
lomats in order to extend a moral claim on U.S. support in favor of the ideals 
that it was spreading through the work of the OCIAA. Lastly, by counseling the 
Department to subject the problem of dictatorship and democracy to careful 
empirical study after the end of the war, Thurston demonstrated a complete 
lack of understanding for the urgency of Salvadorans’ desire for democracy. 
A little over four months after Thurston wrote his report, Martínez had been 
toppled.
Regarding the question of the meaning of U.S. wartime propaganda in 
El Salvador, this text has provided a partial answer. While scholars tend 
to portray the OCIAA’s public diplomacy as comparatively benign cultural 
program, Salvadorans came to interpret it in the context of U.S. interven-
tion and collaboration with a dictatorship that was quickly loosing sup-
port. While the war and U.S. wartime informational programs undoubtedly 
contributed to the opposition against dictatorship in Central America, 
as several historians have already suggested, it is important to note that 
Salvadorans were not passive recipients of such propaganda. Whether 
Salvadoran oppositionists actively subscribed to the message of the OCIAA 
or believed that it reflected a serious commitment of the United States to 
the spread of democracy is a question that requires further research. What 
is clear from the many opposition letters and the placards and flags that 
Salvadorans carried in their marches on the embassy, is that they adopted 
the language of public diplomacy to recruit the United States in their 
local struggle for their liberation. If U.S. diplomats had been able to imag-
ine a democratic future for Central America, it might well have offered 
Washington an opportunity to play a more positive role in the region than 
it did once the Cold War had begun.
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